

~~TOP SECRET~~

2
DECLASSIFIED
DoD R. 11, 1981
DoD R. 11, 1981
By L.O. 3/4/97

THE ARMY'S ROLE IN CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A REPORT TO

William H. Draper, Jr.
Under Secretary of the Army

by

Wallace Carroll

(The Recommendations are
Summarized on Pages 2 and 3)

February 24, 1949

X 71509

V 4207

3E967

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CURRENT

THE ARMY'S ROLE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

CONTENTS	(Page)
NOTE	1
I. PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS	2
✓ II. Preventive Suasion -- A New Idea	4
✓ III. The Nature of the Weapon	7
IV. Army Responsibilities and Activities	12
V. Proposed Reorganization	20
✓ VI. Suggested Projects	30
VII. Conclusion	34
Appendices	
A. Terms of Reference	36
B. Present Responsibilities and Activities	38
C. The Eberstadt Committee and Psychological Warfare	41

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NOTE

W/ In a series of reports the National Security Council has called for a more vigorous foreign information program and an increase of psychological pressure on the Soviet bloc.

NSC 4 directed government departments to coordinate and intensify their foreign information activities, subject to policy control by the State Department. It cited the Army as one of the Departments with the necessary facilities, created a Coordinating Staff with Army representation, and gave this Staff power to initiate and develop plans.

NSC 10/2 authorized covert operations, including covert propaganda. It listed types of operations which would clearly require Army cooperation in the occupied areas.

NSC 20/4 outlined American aims where Russia is concerned - to promote the retraction of Soviet power and the development of public opinion in Russia and elsewhere as a brake on the Soviet government. The maximum strain, it said, should be imposed on the Soviet power structure, particularly on Soviet-satellite relations.

NSC Tentative 35/1 proposes measures in support of these aims. The United States, it says, should "strengthen, maintain and intensify" a vigorous, coordinated foreign information program directed primarily at the Soviet bloc and using "all available means." This section of the report has unanimous agreement at the working level, but has not yet come before the Council.

The Army is already participating in the NSC program. For instance, the Berlin and Vienna radio stations are broadcasting in German and the satellite languages to the region behind the Iron Curtain. As a matter of fact, it appears that the Army is better-equipped than any other Department, including State, to make a powerful contribution to the program.

The Army's facilities and activities, however, are largely uncoordinated and unsupervised, and many opportunities are going unexploited for lack of proper organization.

This report proposes a method of organization by which the Army can make better use of its facilities under appropriate civilian control.

As the Army, together with State, is the only important operator in this period, the report proposes no special arrangements with other branches of the National Military Establishment.

Although the proposed organization is designed primarily to meet the present abnormal situation, it is flexible enough and sound enough to give the Army a flying start in war-time psychological warfare.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

I PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. General Organization.

That a separate psychological warfare unit, with appropriate name and status, be set up to take charge of the Department's activities and responsibilities in the field of psychological warfare (overt and covert).

The Director of this unit to be a general officer or qualified civilian assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary or of one of the Assistant Secretaries. ^{JP} The Director to coordinate the unit's activities with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations.

The unit to have a strictly limited mandate confining its effort, outside the occupied areas, to the Red Army, the satellites and the Soviet Union.

2. Operations.

That the unit take over production and servicing for the Army's foreign information services in the occupied areas.

That it supervise the informational activities in the occupied areas.

That it coordinate and closely supervise the Army's psychological warfare activities originating in the occupied areas but aimed beyond the Iron Curtain.

3. Planning.

That, within the limits of policy plans drawn up by the State

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department, the unit provide operational plans for the psychological warfare activities of the Army overseas, notably for the activities aimed at the Iron Curtain region.

That, subject to supervision by and coordination with the General Staff, the unit be responsible for peace-time planning of the Army's war-time psychological warfare organization and operations.

4. ~~Research~~ and Analysis.

That the unit have a small Research and Analysis (propaganda intelligence) section to provide specialized research for current planning and operations.

5. Liaison.

That the unit undertake all internal and external liaison involving psychological warfare.

6. Training.

That the unit select a given number of officers each year to receive operational and planning experience in the occupied areas, in the State Department's foreign information service, and in the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA.

7. Exploratory mission.

That a small mission proceed immediately to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Greece to make recommendations for intensified operations aimed at the Iron Curtain region.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

II. PREVENTIVE SUASION -- A NEW IDEA

There is a classical solution to the problem which now confronts the United States -- the rise of an aggressive, though weaker, rival. That solution is preventive war. As it happens, a war of that kind would always be abhorrent to Americans. The National Security Council has therefore called for a different solution -- a great national effort in "preventive suasion" designed to roll back Soviet power by means other than war and to discourage it from further aggression. ^{as part of} ~~in~~ this effort the Council has prescribed the better-coordinated and intensified use of psychological warfare.

This report has been written in the light of the Council's conclusions. It has also been influenced by the report of the Eberstadt Committee which found the National Military Establishment negligent in the development of the psychological weapon and recommended "progressive and energetic action" toward a "well-ordered and sizeable program" for peace as well as war. Psychological warfare may be given the status of a special weapon in the national arsenal or it may be treated as a pea-shooter. Neither the Council nor the Eberstadt Committee seems to consider it a pea-shooter. This has been taken into account in drawing up the recommendations of this report.

The report tries to answer three general questions:

What are the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in peace-time psychological warfare?

How can these responsibilities best be met?

How can the Department contribute to the development of a sound national psychological warfare program?

Normally in peace-time the Army would have no right and no

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

reason to be engaged in psychological warfare activities, but the times are not normal. As matters stand, the Army is actively waging psychological warfare, though in a rather off-hand way. And of all agencies of the government, the Army is in the best position to make a quick and effective contribution to the intensified activities called for by the National Security Council.

Never before in our history has the American Army been drawn up in time of peace face to face with the army of our presumptive enemy. From its bases in the occupied areas, the Army can speak to millions behind the Soviet lines and to the Russian soldiers themselves. In the region between the Elbe and the Soviet frontier the officers and men of the Red Army are exposed to psychological pressures which could never be brought to bear upon them in their homeland. Here is an unprecedented opportunity which may never occur again -- an opportunity to gather precise psychological intelligence and to make actual tests of the simple human themes and propaganda arguments which may help to win the cold war or sap the morale of the Red Army in a military war.

If history is a guide, Russia cannot be defeated by invasion or by the sufferings, however terrible, which may be inflicted on her people. In fact, recent history seems to suggest that Russia can only be defeated by the Russians themselves. We know that when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 they were hailed as liberators in many parts of White Russia and the Ukraine and that hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers turned deserter. It was only German brutality which made many Soviet citizens fight for a regime they detested. This was the worst psychological blunder of the war.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Today -- if we have the enterprise and imagination -- we may profit from the German ^{experience} ~~blunder~~. By patient and discreet experimentation from our bases in the occupied areas, we may find the secret of "psychological fission" as it applies to the Red Army and the Soviet peoples. There is no need to stress how valuable we should find that secret if ever we went to war with Russia. But if we can show in time of peace -- even in a limited way -- that we possess this secret, will the Kremlin dare provoke us into war?

If in time of peace we can rally a gr... coalition of peace-loving nations upon our leadership, there will be no war.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

III. THE NATURE OF THE WEAPON

1. Six government departments are trying at the present time to reach agreement on a definition of psychological warfare. Without waiting for them to bring confusion out of chaos, I shall arbitrarily define psychological warfare as:

"Actions or decisions aimed primarily at the will, the nerves, the imagination or the emotions of foreign leaders or peoples, usually by means of words or visual material."

Thus two elements are essential to effective psychological warfare--(1) decisions by the men who wield civil or military power, and (2) exploitation of those decisions by the men who wield the spoken or written word. When organization for psychological warfare is discussed, the first--and most important--of these elements is usually overlooked.

A theoretical example will show how the two elements are combined. (1) The Secretaries of State and Defense decide that the United States will encourage desertion from the Red Army in Germany and Austria. (2) American overt propaganda announces that deserters will no longer be returned to the Soviet authorities; American covert propaganda incites selected Russian officers and men to desert.

A sound psychological warfare organization will therefore make provision for quick two-way communication between the policy-makers and the propagandists. Although the propagandists do not make policy decisions, they need a clear channel to send up ideas to the men who do. For example, the propagandists might have originated the idea of

~~TOP SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

encouraging desertion from the Red Army. On the other hand, the policy-makers need a clear channel by which their decisions--and even their thinking on current problems--can quickly reach the propagandists. This permits the propagandists to capitalize on the good effects of any decision, to hold the bad effects to a minimum, or to point out in advance any psychological disadvantages. And it enables the policy-makers to keep the imagination of the propagandists within bounds.

2. The principles of psychological warfare are not very different from the principles which govern three-dimensional warfare. In both it is a distinct advantage to hold the initiative. In both a good commander will not disperse his effort or let the enemy divert him from his main objective. In 1945 the Russians seized the initiative in the cold war and they held it for two years. During that time the United States remained on the defensive, responding occasionally to some of the more flagrant Communist slanders but fighting under no coordinated plan. Then, in June 1947, General Marshall suddenly seized the initiative with his Harvard speech. That speech forced the Russians to fight on ground of our choosing where we were strong and they were weak. It also brought allies to our side. Although the Russians have been counter-attacking furiously at every point of the globe, they have never been able to regain the initiative.

3. Because the initiative is so important, psychological warfare cannot be waged effectively under divided command. Committees and boards and liaison missions are necessary to bring together all the interests which contribute to psychological warfare. But vital questions

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

of strategy cannot be left to group decision. Somewhere in the two-way channel between policy-makers and propagandists there must be a will which acts with speed, which keeps all efforts concentrated on the main objective and which holds in line the commanders out on the periphery who want to squander their resources on targets of opportunity.

4. Psychological warfare, like three-dimensional warfare, requires planning, both strategic and tactical. The duty of a psychological warfare organization is not to record events, like a newspaper, but to precipitate and shape events. The staff of such an organization must therefore select sharply-defined objectives which presumably can be achieved with the available means. It must set time-tables and phase lines. It must evaluate successes and failures and use this evaluation in the next planning stage.

5. Psychological warfare also requires intelligence--specialized intelligence for both planning and operations. Although it can make use of conventional political and military intelligence, what it needs most of all is information about people's feelings. If interviews and interrogations provide this kind of information, the staff planners can develop effective propaganda themes and the operating units can drive them home day after day with selected news items, commentaries or anecdotes.

6. Effective conduct of psychological warfare requires trained and experienced personnel. Although psychological warfare may be everybody's business, it must be somebody's full-time job. No one would call upon a public information officer to draw the plans for chemical warfare;

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

a Chemical Corps officer should not be expected on five minutes notice to prepare the plans for psychological warfare. Knowledge of the weapons used in psychological warfare and how they can be employed to influence the mind is necessary, and this knowledge can only come from experience.

8. Psychological warfare is inexpensive. That may be why we Americans neglect it. Every so often some one talks of spending billions on psychological warfare. That is all to the good, but even if billions were available it would still be necessary for some of the best brains in the government and armed forces to ^{find time to think} ~~produce ideas~~. Some day some one may take fifteen minutes off to reason like this: "Of all the things the Soviet leaders fear, the thing they fear most is heresy. Of all heresies, the one they fear most is Trotskyism. Therefore we will flood the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria with Trotskyite tracts printed in Russian." It is conceivable that an idea as simple as this might impel the Soviet leaders to pull their troops out of Germany and Austria when diplomatic pressure and military threats might only make them dig in their heels.

9. Because psychological warfare in peace or war requires the cooperation of many agencies and interests, it is always difficult to decide who should control it. The basic fact is that the President and Commander-in-Chief will always have the paramount interest. Only the President can decide when to take a political and psychological defeat in order to win a military success (as in the Darlan arrangement) and when to accept a military handicap in order to safeguard a long-range

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED

interest of a political or psychological nature (as in the unconditional surrender policy for Germany). A sound national psychological warfare organization will therefore have a point of contact with the President.

10. Every nation is vulnerable to psychological warfare in some degree, dictatorships and totalitarian states not excepted. Indeed, the precautions which dictatorships take to shield their peoples from alien influences betray their awareness of this vulnerability. No nation has ever taken such thorough precautions as the Soviet Union--an encouraging sign to the psychological warrior. The early German successes in Russia in 1941, the subsequent formation of the Vlassov Army, the attitude of the thousands who prefer the DP camps to repatriation, and the desertions from the Red Army since the war--all these are further signs that psychological warfare intelligently waged against Russia may bring sensational results.

11. Psychological warfare has often been described as "word warfare". This is about as accurate as calling the other kind of warfare "bullet warfare". A more accurate description would be "idea warfare" or "will warfare".

TOP SECRET
11

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

IV. ARMY RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIVITIES

The key to the present situation is a simple but ~~hitherto~~ elusive fact:-- the United States has a psychological warfare organization in being. This organization comprises the State-Army-CIA overt and covert propaganda operations. In the cold war, this tripartite organization is one of our three or four major weapons. If the cold war should turn into a military conflict tomorrow, this same organization would immediately start to conduct war-time psychological warfare. ^{Such} ~~Whatever~~ skill and experience ^{as} it has acquired would be transmitted to the permanent war-time organization, whatever form the latter might take.

The State-Army-CIA combination is therefore an instrument of national security.

In the current overt operations of State and Army, State is the senior partner. Apart from public legislation entrusting the foreign information program to the State Department, NSC 4 makes the Secretary of State responsible for policy direction and coordination of all foreign information measures. The Secretary of State (or the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs) is therefore the "supreme commander" of the American psychological warfare forces.

The Army, however, is an important operator -- it may even be a bigger operator than State! Consequently the Army is one of those departments or agencies required by NSC-4 "to insure the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropriate facilities."

An annex to NSC 4 mentions some of the Army's facilities but conveys no adequate idea of their extent. For the peoples of the occupied

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

areas, the Army publishes its own newspapers and magazines, operates radio stations, produces its own news reels and documentary films, and maintains 60 cultural centers with libraries and exhibits. Indirectly the Army controls innumerable newspapers, magazines, radio stations, theaters and publishing enterprises. The Armed Forces Network is said to have an eaves-dropping audience of 10 million listeners. Through the indoctrination and education of its troops, the Army is able to exercise a powerful influence upon the peoples of the occupied areas.

From these areas, moreover, the Army's facilities can reach many millions behind the Iron Curtain. The Voice of America, of course, goes to some of these people by short-wave, but the medium-wave transmitters under Army control are a much more potent instrument. RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin) can cover the entire Soviet zone of Germany and reach many German-speaking listeners in the satellite countries. The Red-White-Red network in Austria is heard in the Russian zone in that country and reaches out to the satellites with programs in Serbo-Croat, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Slovene. The Allied station at Trieste also broadcasts in Slovene. Great possibilities for gathering psychological intelligence and spreading word-of-mouth propaganda are presented by the passage of Germans and Austrians from one sector to another in Berlin and Vienna and by the movements of refugees. Finally, the attitude of American officers and men in their contacts with the Russians, however limited these contacts may have become, is a factor to be taken into account.

These facilities -- actual or potential -- for striking behind the Iron Curtain appear to be completely uncoordinated. Berlin, Vienna and Trieste do receive the State Department's guidance notes on News but they

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

receive no strategic directives laying down a long-range program and coordinating their efforts toward a common end. Men who have worked in the Berlin radio station, for instance, say that they received little or no guidance from the Army and State Department authorities in Germany or at home, and that, as a result, they played by ear most of the time. In recent months there has been some improvement, but all in all, it seems that Berlin does not know what Vienna is saying and that neither knows what Trieste is saying. And here in Washington nobody knows what any of the three is saying.

--0--

From all this it is clear that the Army is not confronted with the question of whether or not to participate in current psychological warfare. The fact is that the Army is already deeply engaged in operations whose success may assure peace or whose failure may bring us nearer to war. Thus the Army faces a question of a different sort: How can it use its facilities to better advantage? Or, how can the Army make a decisive contribution to the winning of the cold war?

This brings us to the problem of organization.

Some 15 responsibilities and activities of the Army in psychological warfare are listed in Appendix B -- and they may not be all. Many of them are uncoordinated. The principal responsibilities within the Department appear to be the following:

Indent
The Director of Plans and Operations is responsible for general supervision of psychological warfare activities and the provision of plans and policy guidance.

The Chief of Information is to supervise all current operations in the field of information, public relations or education which have

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Indent

psychological or propaganda implications. He is also to coordinate all overt propaganda or information, foreign or domestic, implemented or disseminated by the Department of the Army.

The Director of Intelligence is responsible for the collection, evaluation and interpretation of sociological and psychological information.

Without going further than these three fields of responsibility for the moment, and without blaming any Division or individual, it might be pointed out that:

No operational plans coordinating the current activities of the Army are being drawn up.

No supervision or coordination of the activities directed at the Iron Curtain countries is taking place.

No propaganda intelligence is being gathered.

In looking into these and other aspects of the present situation, I reached a number of general conclusions:

1. Authority and responsibility are so divided and sub-divided that no division or individual has the power to get things done.
2. All divisions and individuals nominally concerned with psychological warfare are working in a vacuum, remote from the weapon which they are supposed to wield. How can any one draw up plans for psychological warfare when he has no direct knowledge of the weapon and its capabilities? How can any one produce intelligence for it when he does not know what kind of intelligence is needed?
3. There is a tendency to think of a war-time psychological warfare organization as something completely apart from the peace-time

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

organization.

4. Although many officers are firmly convinced that psychological warfare must be one of our major weapons, there is still a kind of inertia which, unless it is overcome, will keep psychological warfare in the pea-shooter class.

In view of this, I felt that the following principles should be taken into account if an effective organization is to be set up within the Department:

1. Lines of authority at the top and of responsibility and accountability down the line should be clearly drawn.
2. Planners, intelligence officers and others doing staff jobs should acquire some knowledge of the weapon itself.
3. The peace-time organization should provide a solid foundation for the war-time organization.
4. Sights should be raised and the weapon should be given a chance to prove its capabilities.

Before proceeding to outline the recommendations which follow from these principles, let me briefly explain the solutions which were proposed.

1. That psychological warfare be centered in a Division under the Chief of Information.
2. That authority over psychological warfare be centralized under the Director of Plans and Operations.
3. That a Special Staff Division be created under a general officer reporting to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat operations and under the general supervision of the Under Secretary.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

4. That a separate psychological warfare unit be established in the office of the Under Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries with appropriate coordination with the General Staff.

Let me quickly examine each of these.

1. Under the Chief of Information

The argument, in brief, in favor of this course was that the Chief of Information controls the information outlets and facilities, that it is necessary to coordinate public information and psychological warfare, and that Troop Education and Information must also be coordinated with psychological warfare aims.

There is much to this argument. It should also be pointed out that the Chief of Information and his representative on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff deserve great credit for the recent improvement in the guidance sent to the occupied areas. Nevertheless, I feel ^{that} there are decisive reasons why psychological warfare should not be lodged here. To put the Chief of Information in charge of psychological warfare is to condemn him to a Jekyll and Hyde existence especially if covert propaganda comes under his jurisdiction. More important, it exposes the Department to legitimate attack in Congress and the press. The Department's information set-up ought to be a little better than Caesar's wife. The Army cannot afford to give any critic the chance to say that it is tampering with the information which it gives the American people.

2. Plans and Operations

For this course it is argued that the Division of Plans and Operations is the heart of the Army, that it originates all strategic plans and has access to all intelligence. Put psychological warfare

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

here with enough authority behind it, say the proponents, and it will be integrated into all plans -- it may even have an influence on planning. It will also get all the intelligence it requires. Put it elsewhere, and it will always be overlooked, both for plans and intelligence.

These arguments, too, have considerable merit, and I feel that in the course of time, if conditions return to something like "normal", psychological warfare may find its natural home in this Division. But for the present abnormal situation I believe that this solution would be a mistake. Psychological warfare happens to be at the present time one of the most operational of all the Army's activities. While it might be feasible to put planning in this Division, I doubt whether the Division would care to take over the operational end. Thus the divorce between staff activities and operations which is the prime curse of the present arrangement would be perpetuated. In this Division, moreover, psychological warfare would be little more than a distraction or part-time interest. The impulsion to psychological warfare which the National Security Council has called for would not materialize under such an arrangement.

3. A Special Staff Division

A Division of this kind, reporting to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations and under the general supervision of the Under Secretary, would satisfy the four principles which I have listed above. In its favor it is argued that it would centralize authority, bring staff and operators together, meet the present emergency while providing a sound basis for a war-time organization, and give psychological warfare the status it deserves.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Against this solution various arguments are made: that the problem should be solved within the existing staff organization; that it is unwise to create a new unit to handle a new product; that such a Division would be forgotten when plans and decisions were being made; that it would never receive the intelligence it needed.

Nevertheless, this is the solution which I would recommend if no other considerations were involved. But I have been told that in view of the pending reorganization of the General Staff it would be extremely difficult to set up such a Division in a reasonable length of time, even if it received general assent. In the meantime psychological warfare would languish. I therefore waive my recommendation in favor of this solution while drawing attention to its merits.

4. A Separate Unit on the Secretarial Level

This solution, it is contended, satisfies the principles I have listed just as well as a Special Staff Division. It would bring psychological warfare responsibilities and activities together in one unit -- a condition which I consider absolutely essential to any genuine solution. Moreover, it would have greater flexibility than a Special Staff Division. It could, for example, be easily adapted to decisions which may be taken regarding a joint psychological warfare organization at the NME level. As psychological warfare at the present time is primarily a political instrument, there would be an advantage in having the unit under the Under Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries. Finally, there is the time factor -- this solution could be put into effect without long delay.

For these reasons, and for others which follow, I strongly recommend this solution. My detailed proposals for reorganization are contained in the next Section.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

V. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION

(Note: This Section elaborates the Recommendations summarized in Section ~~III~~ I)

1. General Organization.

Recommendation:

That a separate psychological warfare unit, with appropriate name and status, be set up to take charge of the Department's activities and responsibilities in the field of psychological warfare (overt and covert).

The Director of this unit to be a general officer or qualified civilian assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary or of one of the Assistant Secretaries.

The Director to coordinate the unit's activities with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations.

The unit to have a strictly limited mandate confining its effort, outside the occupied areas, to the Red Army, the Satellites and the Soviet Union.

--0--

The general advantages of this solution flow from the principles of reorganization which I listed earlier. They may be restated as follows:

- a. Authority and responsibility would be centralized.
- b. Reality would be given to staff work because planners, intelligence officers and others would have first-hand knowledge of the weapon and concrete tasks to perform.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

- c. The Army's facilities for fighting the cold war could quickly be put to more effective use.
- d. A sound foundation would be laid for a war-time organization which in an emergency could start to wage psychological warfare without the loss of a day.
- e. The Army would at last have an opportunity to wield the psychological weapon with imagination and vigor. The necessary channel for the two-way flow of ideas would be set up and the deadening influence of committee work by part-time enthusiasts would be held to the minimum.
- f. A reserve of experience and skill would be built up.

This unit would take over not only the Army's overt activities but would also be responsible for any Army participation in covert psychological warfare. It is absolutely essential that covert planning and operations be coordinated with overt. This could easily be done in this unit, but the covert side, of course, would be subject to special security precautions and it would not be necessary for overt operators to be acquainted with covert plans and projects.

To keep the unit from dispersing its energies, its "offensive" activities would be confined to the area in which the National Security Council has indicated a special interest. Its targets in the order of priority would be:

- a. The Red Army outside the Soviet Union.
- b. The satellite armies and populations.
- c. The Soviet Union.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

2. Operations.

Recommendation:

That the unit take over production and servicing for the Army's foreign information and educational services in the occupied areas.

That it supervise the informational activities in the occupied areas.

That it coordinate and closely supervise the Army's psychological warfare activities originating in the occupied areas but aimed beyond the Iron Curtain.

--0--

These three fields of activity are at present largely unsupervised. It is time that the first two were reviewed to make sure that aims and methods are not out of date. By taking over these two well-established and accepted activities, the unit within the Department would obtain cover for the more aggressive psychological warfare now envisaged. In the theaters, however, it would be necessary to take precautions to protect the good name of the information services from possible taint.

--0--

3. Planning.

Recommendation:

That, within the limits of policy plans drawn up by the State Department, the unit provide operational plans for the ^{current} psychological warfare activities of the Army overseas, notably for the activities aimed at the Iron Curtain region.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

That, subject to supervision by and coordination with the General Staff, the unit be responsible for peace-time planning of the Army's war-time psychological warfare organization and operations.

--O--

As already pointed out the State Department is responsible for policy plans, and all operational plans for overt propaganda would have to be within the policy lines sanctioned by that Department. Covert propaganda is the special province of the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, and any plans in that field would have to be initiated by that office, which, however, would welcome Army participation.

The planning envisaged by the above recommendation might be elaborated as follows:

a. For peace-time activities.

The Division would provide guidance for the production and servicing activities at present carried on by the Re-orientation Branch and the New York Field Office and for the informational activities in the occupied areas. It would provide "strategic plans" for Army psychological warfare activities originating in the occupied territories (and possibly Greece) and aimed at the Iron Curtain areas.

b. For war-time activities.

The Division would prepare the Army's organizational and operational plans for war-time psychological warfare. It would supervise planning for war-time psychological warfare operations by the Logistics Division and the

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Technical Staffs and Services.

c. For inter-departmental planning.

The Division would prepare studies and recommendations for the Secretary of the Army on psychological warfare matters arising in the War Council, the National Security Council and other inter-departmental bodies.

--O--

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

4. Research and Analysis

Recommendation:

That the unit have a small Research and Analysis (propaganda intelligence) section to provide specialized research for current planning and operations.

— 0 —

In both tactical and strategic psychological warfare operations it has been found that specialized propaganda intelligence is required. G-2 was never equipped to provide this kind of intelligence, and, in fact, would have found it burdensome. The solution was to provide the Psychological Warfare Branch in the Mediterranean Theater, the Psychological Warfare Division in the European Theater and OWI at home with their own research and analysis units which did the detailed work of monitoring the enemy press and radio ~~broadcasts~~ and interrogating refugees and prisoners after G-2 and the other intelligence agencies had finished with them.

The proposed Research and Analysis Section would provide classified research for psychological warfare planning and unclassified or declassified research for operations. One of its principal tasks would be to study morale in the Red Army outside Russia and find the factors which help to make good morale and those which help to make bad morale. With this kind of research, the planners could develop propaganda themes calculated to produce bad morale.

The proposed section would also be responsible for supplying the

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Director of Intelligence with summaries of its morale findings to be used in General Staff planning.

The section would not interfere with long-range research within the Research and Development Group.

5. Liaison

Recommendation:

That the unit undertake all internal and external liaison involving psychological warfare.

This would include the following duties:

Providing representation on the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Staff set up under NSC 4 and maintaining general liaison with the State Department on overt operations.

Providing representation on the Advisory Council of the Office of Special Projects, CIA, and any other Army liaison with CIA on covert propaganda.

Providing representation on the nucleus organization for peacetime planning of war-time activities to be set up in the State Department by decision of the National Security Council.

Providing liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Military Establishment.

Providing liaison with the Air Force and Navy on operational and technical planning.

Providing liaison with the Chief of Information on public information and troop information and indoctrination.

Providing liaison with the Research and Development Group.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

6. Training

Recommendation:

That the unit select a given number of officers each year to receive operational and planning experience in the occupied areas, in the State Department's foreign information service, and in the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA.

That it call in reserve officers and other qualified civilians for temporary work on plans and operations at home and abroad.

— o —

This would be in addition to any psychological warfare courses in the Army schools. Such courses cannot do more than create an awareness of psychological warfare and stimulate an interest in it. Real understanding can only come from participation. By placing officers in the organization which is already functioning, it will be possible to give them experience in peace-time in the delicate and complex job of fitting propaganda to foreign policy and strategy. It will also compel them to think about some of the difficulties which arise when you try to flank a strong-point in the mental defenses of a German, a Pole or a Russian.

The purpose of this training would not necessarily be to turn Army officers into "expert propagandists" but mainly to acquaint them with the problems of organization, planning and operations.

By bringing in reserve officers and other qualified civilians, the Army could tap the very limited reserves of propaganda skill which exist in the United States and keep that skill available for speedy mobilization.

— o —
TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED


7. Exploratory Mission.

Recommendation:

That a small mission proceed immediately to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Greece to make recommendations for intensified operations aimed at the Iron Curtain region.

--O--

It might be well to include a representative of the State Department and the Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, in this mission. Among the matters it would investigate would be the following:



TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

~~V. EXPEDIENT MISSION~~

The extent of present psychological warfare facilities and how they can be used to better advantage.

How new facilities can be added.

(Besides the obvious facilities, such as radio, the mission should look into questions like these: What can be accomplished through indoctrination of the American officers and men who are in contact with the Red Army and satellite armies? Can the State Department's Russian magazine be infiltrated into Red Army units? Would it be worthwhile to infiltrate other American publications, notably illustrated magazines? What use can be made of Displaced Persons?

How the Germans and Austrians in the Russian zones and sectors can be used, consciously or unconsciously, to work on the morale of the Red Army.

How all the facilities directed at the Iron Curtain area can be coordinated. (X) What kind of strategic guidance and operational material is needed from Washington?

What steps need to be taken to obtain better propaganda intelligence (for State as well as Army) from such sources as:

Deserters.

Displaced persons and other refugees.

Friendly natives.

American officers and men who are in contact with officers and men of the Red Army and satellite armies.

Radio monitoring of Soviet troop broadcasts (if any).

Whether we can obtain help and cooperation from the British and French.

TOP SECRET
29

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

VI. SUGGESTED PROJECTS

As I have pointed out, the Army is handicapped at present not only by organizational difficulties but by the inability of the men interested in psychological warfare to lay their hands on anything concrete. To overcome this difficulty, I list a number of concrete operations and projects

A. Research and Analysis.

1. Fission in Russia.

From German sources it appears that when the Germans entered the Soviet Union in 1941 they were received as liberators in many parts of White Russia and the Ukraine. The German Army treated the inhabitants reasonably well and found many of them so docile that they could be used in its supply services. Later the Vlassov Army was formed of Russian prisoners of war, and if the statements of former members of this Army are true, it reached a total of 800,000 men. But Nazi doctrine frustrated the aims of the German Army. Hitler decreed that the Russians should be treated as "sub-human". The result was the partisan movement and the rallying of the people to the Soviet regime.

A study should be made of these events and of the available intelligence on the post-war disturbances in the Ukraine and the Baltic States. This should be a practical -- not an academic -- study. It should try to uncover the motives which apparently impelled several million Russians to turn against the regime and -- if this is possible -- it should even seek the precise arguments which they used to justify this action to themselves. It should also try to establish whether these motives and

30
TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

arguments are valid at the present time. But this should be more than a study for psychological warfare operations -- it should be an important contribution to intelligence for top level strategic planning. For, obviously, if it might be possible in time of war to detach large areas from allegiance to Moscow by "psychological fission", we should think a long time before we decide to apply atomic fission to these areas and risk having them turn against us as they turned against the Germans.

2. What Moves Brother Ivan?

With hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers stationed outside the Soviet Union, it is possible to do what could never be done within Russia itself -- gather precise psychological intelligence on the Red Army. This can be done by a small research and analysis unit in Germany and Austria. One method would be to draw up half a dozen questions which could be worked into casual conversation -- questions designed to uncover what the Russian ^{thinks he} likes or dislikes about America. These questions would then be asked, casually and informally, by properly-indoctrinated GI's, Germans, Austrians and others. The answers would be analyzed and simple propaganda themes developed. These themes could be tested on the Russians by the same informal, conversational method before they were used in broadcasts or other mass media.

3. Propaganda Analysis.

An analysis should be made of Soviet propaganda to the Red Army outside Russia to discover the weaknesses in morale which the regime is trying to correct. These weaknesses can then be exploited in propaganda aimed at the Red Army.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B. Planning

Softening-up Plans.

The war plans for the American forces in Germany and Austria should make provision for psychological warfare activity -- both tactical and strategic -- designed to cause the maximum demoralization in the Red Army. But some of this psychological warfare activity should already be under way. For example, there is one theme which would certainly be the keynote of American wartime propaganda: "We are fighting the Soviet regime, not the Russian soldier." Now such a theme cannot become effective overnight. So why not start now to convince any and all Russians who can be reached that "Americans are friendly"? Planning toward this end would provide for the immediate indoctrination of all American officers and men who are now in contact with the Russians and the ultimate indoctrination of all the American forces in Europe. It would also explore new means, direct and indirect, of reaching the Russians with this message so that if war should come, psychological warfare operations would have a running start. Clearly, there are great difficulties, particularly in indoctrinating Americans who have been exposed to Russian intransigence, but those difficulties will certainly not be less after the blood begins to flow.

C. Technical Planning

Leaflet Deliveries

In the last war, the Soviet government called in all radio sets, and it would probably do the same in a future war. For this reason leaflets may be the best way to reach the Russian masses. The research project ("Fission in Russia") suggested above may show that there are areas of Russia where the population is particularly susceptible to subversion.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

What are the possibilities of developing leaflet rockets to be launched from land bases, surface vessels or submarines? These and other possibilities should be explored within the Army and in cooperation with the other services.

— — — — —

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

VII. CONCLUSION

The reorganization proposed in this report may have its ^{inconveniences} ~~drawbacks~~. Some of the suggested changes and projects may seem difficult or even fantastic. Yet in this day of fifteen billion dollar military budgets, irrepressible atoms, supersonic planes and restless populations, the effort envisaged is truly a very modest one.

One of the great intangible advantages of setting up a ^{psychological} Reorientation ^{warfare unit} ~~Division~~ would be the attraction it would exercise over the "alumni" of the wartime psychological warfare organizations. Recently a dinner was given in New York for the former head of the Psychological Warfare Division in the European Theater. More than 125 men and women turned out, primarily as a tribute to the man but also because they still were under the fascination of the weapon they had helped to wield. If the Army chooses, it can take advantage of this fascination to draw upon the brain-power of many exceptionally gifted men who do not feel able to serve in the government in time of peace. Once it ^{becomes} ~~became~~ known among the initiated that the Army ^{is} ~~was~~ giving a recognized status to psychological warfare, they ^{will} ~~would~~ be glad to help, and in this branch of warfare, all kinds of help are needed.

In your instructions you asked me to concentrate my attention on current psychological warfare and foreign information. As I have pointed out, the Army is probably in a better position than any other agency to contribute to intensified activity in the cold war. For this reason I tried to devise the kind of organization which would enable the Army to play a part now in the fulfillment of the national objectives. At the same time I kept in mind the kind of organization which it would need if

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

I have recommended
war came. I feel sure that ~~this same~~ *the* kind of organization, with centralized authority and responsibility, would also fit into any over-all psychological warfare body which might be set up in the National Military Establishment.

As for what that over-all body might be, I can only suggest this -- and it is no more than a suggestion. Why not set up a small *informal* Idea Group? Its head would be an unorthodox thinker whose full-time job gives him access to essential political and strategic thinking. He would meet *psychological* informally about once a month with the Director of the Army's ~~Reorientation~~ *Warfare unit* Division and with representatives of the other services. His contact with the State Department would be with the Policy Planning staff *as well as* rather than with the information service. He would also be in touch with the alumni of the psychological warfare organizations. And his mission would simply be to turn up two ideas a year by which the latent power, the character, the integrity and the ingenuity of the armed forces would be used to *effort* further the national ~~political objectives.~~ *in "preventive*
suasion."

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

26 January 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALLACE CARROLL

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare

1. The National Security Council has called for the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign information activities of the U. S. Government. It places the responsibility for policy direction on the Secretary of State but requires appropriate departments and agencies (including the Department of the Army) to assure the most effective coordination and utilization of their facilities in the execution of approved policies.
2. During your 30-day period of consultation you are asked to make a study with the objective of determining:
 - a. What are the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in the foreign information and psychological warfare program (overt and covert) of the U.S. Government?
 - b. How should these responsibilities be fulfilled?
 - c. What should be the role of the Department in the development of a national psychological warfare program?
3. Your study should be concerned mainly with current foreign information and psychological warfare. It should touch upon war planning only if this planning and peace-time activities overlap. Your report should be positive and constructive.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

4. You will be given access to all documents, approved or pending, on the subjects of psychological warfare or foreign information emanating from the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Army and the State Department. Access to these papers will be arranged by this office.

5. Your report, to be submitted at least one week before completion of your consultative period, will contain a brief statement of not more than two pages containing conclusions and recommendations, with appropriate supporting material and appendices. The report will be "Personal to Mr. Draper, Under Secretary of the Army."

William H. Draper, Jr.
Under Secretary of the Army

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX B

PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIVITIES

The following are the principal responsibilities within the Department of the Army and the chief activities now being carried on:

1. The Director of Plans and Operations is responsible for general supervision of Army psychological warfare activities, provision of planning and policy guidance and certain operational direction (WD Memorandum 575-10-1, 10 January, 1947).
2. The Director of Intelligence is responsible for the collection, evaluation, and interpretation of sociological and psychological information and the analysis of foreign propaganda affecting the military interests of the United States (Same).
3. The Director of Organization and Training is responsible for provision for psychological warfare units and bulk authorizations in the organization of appropriate echelons of the Army; also for General Staff direction of Army training in psychological warfare tactics and techniques (Same).
4. The Director of Logistics is responsible for inclusion of psychological warfare materiel and supplies in logistical planning (Same memorandum which assigned these responsibilities to Director of Service, Supply and Procurement, WDGS).
5. The Director of Research and Development is responsible for the adaptation of existing materiel to psychological warfare employment and the development of new materiel and techniques (Same).

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

6. The Chief of Information is responsible for the consideration of psychological warfare implications in the formulation of Army information policies (Same). He is also charged with the supervision of all current operations in the field of information, public relations and education which have psychological or propaganda implications, and with the coordination of all overt propaganda or information, domestic and foreign, implemented or disseminated by the Department of the Army (Staff Study approved by the Secretary of the Army, 16 February, 1948).

7. The Reorientation Branch of the Civil Affairs Division is responsible for certain policy matters and servicing activities connected with the re-education of the populations of the occupied areas.

8. The New York Field Office of the Civil Affairs Division (now a separate Branch independent of the Reorientation Branch) produces or procures news features, news reels, documentary and feature films, exhibits, magazines and other materials for the information services in the occupied areas.

9. The Research and Development Group (Logistics Division) is conducting research in psychological warfare through the Operations Research Office, Fort McNair.

10. The Chief of Information has a representative (Lt. Colonel William H. Kinard, Jr.) on the Sub-Panel on Psychological Warfare, Committee on Human Resources, Research and Development Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense).

11. The Chief of Information has a representative (Lt. Colonel Kinard) on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff set up under NSC 4 to help the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

12. The Chief of Information has an Army information committee including representation from FID, L&LD, TIAE, CAD and P&O under the chairmanship of Lt. Colonel Kinard. Each member is responsible within his division for compliance with relevant propaganda directives.

13. The Director of Plans and Operations has a representative (Lt. Colonel Frederick R. Young) on the Sub-Committee for Special Studies and Evaluations, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee.

14. The Director of Plans and Operations has representatives on the Advisory Council, Office of Special Projects, Central Intelligence Agency.

15. The Headquarters of the Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., has a section charged with developing tactical psychological warfare plans and organization.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX C

THE EBERSTADT COMMITTEE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Report To The Commission On Organization Of The Executive Branch Of The
Government By The Committee On The National Security Organization

Vol. I - November 15, 1948

"Introduction - The problem"

"The Committee is not satisfied with the present position in regard to the manifold and difficult problems presented by new and unconventional methods of warfare and by the development and preparation of measures for psychological warfare and against the mass destruction weapons of biological, chemical, and radiological war. The need for adequate provision for civil defense has been recognized and measures are being taken in this field, but more vigorous and intelligent attention must be devoted to providing better systems for internal security and for psychological warfare."

* * * * *

"Summary of Major Recommendations."

"VI. PREPARATIONS FOR NEW AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

"Foresight, imagination, and vigor are necessary (a) to secure the life and property of our citizens against subversive efforts, (b) to minimize the effects of internal damage in case of war, and (c) to guard against attacks by unconventional means and weapons.

"To that end, the Committee recommends:

"(d) that more vigorous and active attention be given to psychological warfare and to the development of effective programs in this field. Responsibility should be definitely allocated for various activities in this field, including the establishment of a comprehensive policy-forming

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

and coordinating mechanism to knit together in peace and in war all of the psychological warfare activities of the Government.

"Findings and Conclusions.

("VI. CIVIL DEFENSE, INTERNAL SECURITY, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DEMAND MORE VIGOROUS ATTENTION.)

"74. Psychological Warfare must not be Neglected.

"Psychological and moral defense of the civil population is intimately related to its material defense, but falls into a different field. Offensive psychological warfare is at present receiving some attention. The Committee is, however, strongly of the opinion that this activity demands much greater support than it has received in the past. The battle for the minds of men may decide the struggle for the world. The Committee found present facilities and mechanisms for the waging of psychological warfare inadequate. The National Security Council has taken cognizance of this matter. It should establish mechanisms for proper coordination of various activities in this field, now scattered through several Government departments and agencies."

Vol. III - November 15, 1948

Chapter XIV. Civil Defense, Internal Security, Psychological Warfare, and Unconventional Warfare

"EVALUATION

"Psychological Warfare

"The Committee was happy to note from secret testimony that important steps in this field recently have been instituted by Government. These steps, however, were belated, and seem to the Committee to be only the beginnings of what should be developed by progressive and energetic action into a well-ordered and sizeable program. The Committee

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

is certain that this subject should receive the quiet but continuous scrutiny of the National Security Council and the Secretary of State. The battle for the minds of men is clearly an important part of the cold war."

TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Carroll

25 February 1949

Secretary of Army

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROYALL

SUBJECT: The Army's Role in Current Psychological Warfare

1. The attached study of the Army's responsibilities in current psychological warfare was prepared by Mr. Wallace Carroll while on a 30-day consultative basis in my office. The report is well thought out and has been developed in the light of ideas and suggestions made by the different agencies in the Department of the Army presently engaged to some degree in this field.

2. I agree in principle with the conclusions and recommendations of this report and wish to mention particularly several significant points:

a. An organization to be charged with psychological warfare in the Department of the Army should be supervised by the Under Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries. This organizational placement should be determined after analysis and consideration of the report.

b. Mr. Gordon Gray, The Assistant Secretary of the Army, should be named as the supervisor of this program, if it is approved.

c. The Army's part in any program must, of course, rigidly follow policy direction emanating from the State Department.

d. The suggested initial psychological warfare target of the Red Army and satellite armed forces is an excellent one since it is consistent with the mission of the U.S. armed forces.

e. Mr. Carroll, an acknowledged expert in this field, has generously offered his part-time services for a limited period. He can be of assistance in the selection of personnel to man the organization and in the development of early plans and policy.

3. Mr. Gray and General Wedemeyer have read and discussed this report. I have not had an opportunity to learn their views, but understand that

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

both of them agree in principle with the conclusion and recommendations of this report.

Incl
Report

William H. Draper, Jr.
Under Secretary of the Army

~~TOP SECRET~~

WALLACE CARROLL

BOX 5 FOLDER 6

Psychological
warfare

Section III
COLDWARR PAPERS

No. 2

"Army's Role in Current Psychological
Warfare" Report

1949